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THE NEW WAGE-HOUR ACT*
By MARTIN CONBOY, Member of the New York Bar
HE proposal to have wages and hours fixed by agencies
under the authority of the Federal government constitutes about the farthest removal from what has been
called the horse and buggy era that has thus far come under
contemplation. To account for it, regardless of whether the
measure is good or bad, constitutional or unconstitutional, we
are obliged to realize that it has something to do with a change
in the pattern of society, for at a time well within the memory
of many of us no one would have even dreamt of such a
recourse.
It was my privilege to deliver an address on this subject
to the Federation of Bar Associations of the Fifth Judicial District at its annual meeting on September 24th.
ECONOMIC DEPRESSION

There is a vast flood of literature on the subject of how
best to effect recovery from conditions identified with the economic depression of recent years. A feature common to all of
them is the acceptance of conditions now found to prevail.
There is a depression problem in agriculture. There is one in
transportation. There is one in industry. There is one in
labor. There is one in unemployment. Seldom, it is to be
noticed, does anyone stop to inquire how the unsatisfactory
conditions have come about, and still less often does anyone
seek to relate what has happened in one division to what has
happened in the others.
The fact probably is that at the time the changes were
becoming effective not much attention was paid to them in a
general way. They came about in periods of fairly uniform
prosperity, during which only the good side of them invited
more than passing notice. For more than that, everyone was
too busily engaged. It was only when the momentum lessened
that reasons were sought for the void that suddenly appeared.
CAUSE AND EFFECT

And yet it is plain that cause and effect are not to be separated. There have been similar dislocations before this one.
For example, the lordly mansions that adorned the great
*Courtesy of Mt. Conboy and the New York State Bar Association Bulletin.
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southern plantations in the first half of the last century were
built upon extensive cultivation of tobacco and cotton. Production rested upon the forced labor of negro slaves. Distribution and the resultant fortunes rested with demand overseas,
mainly in England. Under the dual threat of freeing the
slaves and of endangering the foreign market by setting up
high tariffs against the manufactures of the country that
bought most of the cotton and tobacco, the Union itself was
placed in imminent danger, with war as the final instrument of
political policy. The conditions contributing to prosperity,
in that instance, were altered by unsuccessful war, and war was
followed by half a century or more of inability to recover from
the losses that had been sustained in what was the richest portion of the continent.
AGRICULTURE

In the half century after the Civil War, the industrial development in England made that country the principal customer for all the wheat the United States could spare from its
own wants, the prairies were opened, and the railroads derived
from the increased output perhaps the main impulsion to their
spread. Now we have a different situation, and both the
wheat producers and the railroads are in trouble.
Agriculture is, as a whole, affected by a different sort of
change. In the beginning of our civilization the land was the
immediate source of sustenance for all, and all participated in
the effort to make it productive. Concern was for the product
of the homestead. We have gone from that to a situation in
which all the varieties of soil and of climate are at the service
of every consumer. Those of us who go by motor car into the
farm areas near the great cities are offered the privilege of buying, from local stands, what are supposed to be the produce of
the neighborhood, but are actually in many instances, those of
Georgia, California or Colorado. And in the process of change
the proportion of the population actually engaged in agriculture has been subject to continuous reduction.
INDUSTRY

We seldom stop to think that in the beginnings of manufacturing industry there was a relation to the agricultural element that long ago disappeared. The farmers' sons and
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daughters added something to the family income by the work
they did, at certain seasons, in the mills. At a slightly later
stage, the mill, and its more or less steadily employed staff, was
part of an entity of which the small town and the adjacent
rural area were also parts. This phase still continues in, for
example, sections of Connecticut, and yet the great number of
abandoned farms in that state bears witness to the decision
ultimately reached to abandon agriculture and depend upon
the rewards to be had from service in the mills or in the commerce attendant on industrial development. In the larger
cities, there was no nexus with the soil. The adjunct to the
work in the factory was the work sent out to be done in the
homes.
NEw DEVELOPMENTS

The depression problem, as it relates to industry, consists
in there being less work to be done in the factories, and no
work at all for a varying ratio of those who have no experience
in any other kind of productive effort. Their number is out
of all proportion to that which would have had to be provided
for in any of the earlier phases. Moreover, in the stage of
development when agriculture was an adjunct of industry the
families of those out of employment could share with them
the products of the soil and assure them of shelter. In the
present condition neither the one nor the other resource is
available.
There are two further aspects of the change that invite
attention. One is that the progress of invention has contributed to the creation of new industries, of which the motor
car and the radio are examples, and has brought them to the
peak of their possibilities of output, and then beyond their
possibilities of employment. The creation of other new industries has not been rapid enough to take up the slack. The
second is that, just as agriculture, transportation, industry
have increased in volume, so have they ceased to be local. The
tendency has been for all of them to adapt themselves to the
governing circumstance that in habits, tastes, outlook, we are,
as a Supreme Court decision once put it, "all one people."
Bands of farm laborers follow the harvest from state to state
nowadays, whereas in the long ago the utmost effort of the
kind was neighborly interchange of help. Grocery and other
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stores under one management are found from coast to coast.
The same fashions in clothes are followed in Indianapolis and
Seattle as in New York. And those who are out of work are
out of the same kinds of work, everywhere, if they ever have
been employed, or unable to find employment in the same
range of employments if they have just completed school and
are seeking to provide for themselves.
SOLUTION PROBLEMATICAL

WI-at is always important, and never to be lost sight of,
is that all these changes, imperceptible as they occurred, or at
any rate accepted without apprehension of disagreeable consequences, came about through the free play of initiative, courage, industry in the sense of continuous application, on the
part of individuals seeking the rewards appropriate to their
individual capacities. And what has led to whatever complication there may. be associated with the legislation now under
consideration is that, for the time being at least, the reliance
hitherto placed upon the effectiveness of this system is no
longer. available to those who have been let down as the whole
complex has slowed down. There are those who hold that
adjustment will be effected, that the mass intelligence will
find a mass answer to the problem. But it is plain that great
numbers of those to whom the answer is not patent find themselves under the necessity of asking the government to produce a more immediate solution of the difficulty. Demand has
been made upon Congress to that effect, and the Act now under
consideration is the present answer of Congress to part of that
demand. By specifying the number of hours one may work
per week, it seeks to increase the number of employed. By
naming a minimum wage, it seeks to set a minimum standard
of subsistence for those who are employed. And it adopts,
at least for the time being, the view that the people, who. are
the government, can mitigate the evil into which the people,
as participants in the process of improvement through the
sum of individual effort and initiative, have been precipitated,
whether by their own incapacity or by conditions in the world
outside over which they have no control.
FAIR LABOR ACT AN APPROACH

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 is an approach
to the problem insofar as it concerns factory output, whether
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within the walls or outside them, and whether, in fact, the
groupment of men or women in a common effort demands
such enclosure. Six months ago the President approved the
Act, generally called the Wage-Hour Law, which was passed
by Congress in June and which went into effect October 24th.
The President has described the law as fixing a floor below
wages and a ceiling above hours of labor and as putting an end
to child labor. It is obvious, therefore, that the practical
effects which the law may have on the American economic system may be very great but that is a subject which falls within
the domain of economics rather than of law and I leave it to
the economists.
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

The statute involves important constitutional questions
which must be of interest to lawyers. In order to view the
constitutional questions involved a brief outline of the principal provisions of the Act are referred to.
One section fixes a minimum wage to be paid to employees engaged in commerce (meaning interstate commerce)
and in the production of goods for commence. The minimum
rate is 25c per hour during the first year; 30c per hour during
the next six years; and 40c per hour thereafter. The 40c rate
is subject to the power of the Administrator appointed by the
President to establish a lower rate (not less than 30c per hour
in industries where circumstances warrant it).
Another section of the Act provides that no employee
shall work more than a certain number of hours per week
(the number finally gets down to 40) unless he is paid overtime wages.
Another section provides that
"No producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall ship in interstate commerce any goods produced in an establishment situated anywhere in the
United States in or about which any oppressive child labor has been
employed."

These are the three provisions which, I assume, the President had in mind when he described the effect that the law
would have.
Of course, minimum wage and maximum hour legislation and the prohibition of child labor are not innovations of
the year 1938.
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The first protective legislation in England was the Health
and Morals Act to Regulate Labour of Bound Children in
Cotton Factories, sponsored by Sir Robert Peel and adopted in
1802. This Act forbade the binding out of children younger
than nine years, restricted the hours to twelve actual working
hours a day, and prohibited night work. (3 Ency. Social
Sciences, P. 414).
There has, of course, been continuing enlargement of
the scope of labor legislation in Great Britain since that time.
Under the British Trade Boards Acts of 1909 and 1918, the
Minister of Labor was empowered to fix minimum wages.
Congress gave recognition to the eight hour day by making it compulsory on all contractors upon public works of the
United States (Acts of August 1, 1892 and of March 3, 1913;
40 U. S. C., 321-3), and for employees of carriers engaged in
interstate and foreign commerce (Act of September 3-5, 1916;
45 U. S. C., sec. 65).
NEW YORK STATE LAWS
The amended Constitution of this State passed by the
Constitutional Convention last Summer and adopted by the
voters at the general election of 1938 contains this new section
in Article I, Bill of Rights, taken from Article 8 of the Labor
Law:
"Section 17 * * * No laborer, workman or mechanic, in the
employ of a contractor or sub-contractor engaged in the performance of
any public work, shall be permitted to work more than eight hours in
any day or more than five days in any week, except in cases of extraordinary emergency; nor shall be paid less than the rate of wages prevailing
in the same trade or occupation in the locality within the state where
such public work is to be situated, erected or used."

Article 5 of our Labor Law entitled "Hours of Labor"
contains numerous provisions with reference to hours of labor
of operators of motor vehicles and motor buses, state employees, children under sixteen, females over sixteen, females
over eighteen in sauerkraut canneries, minors between sixteen
and eighteen in certain kinds of business; females on street
railroads and male minors and females in telegraph or messenger service.
By Section 69-a of the General Business Law of this
State, added by Laws of 1937, Chapter 806, in effect January
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1, 1938, the sAle of goods produced by child labor is prohibited. The term "child labor" is defined as employment of
persons under sixteen years of age. (Section 69-b).
Article 8 of the Labor Law, as we have observed, fixes
hours of work and wages on public works and Section 220d
requires that the advertised specifications for every contract for
the construction, etc., of public work shall state the minimum
hourly rate of wages which can be paid to those employed in
the performance of the contract.
Assuming that our social and economic needs require
legislation of this character to overcome evils against which
these laws are addressed, our system of dual governmental
authority and the constitutional doctrine of delegated powers
raise a peculiar difficulty, so far as federal legislation is concerned by which England and even the states of the Union are
not affected.
CONGRESSIONAL POWER

Granting that the need for the legislation exists, has the
Federal Congress, which speaks territorially for the entire
nation but, in domestic matters, under powers delegated by
the states, authority to enact laws of this character? It can
be very plausibly argued that the whole field of economic
legislation can, in view of the nationwide character of even
local enterprises, be efficiently handled only by the federal
government.
This is the theory which lies back of the finding of Congress:

* * the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental
to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used
to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the
several states; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce:
(4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the orderly
and fair marketing of goods in commerce."
"*

And it is the declared policy of the Act:
* * through the exercise by Congress of its power to regulate
commerce among the several states, to correct, and as rapidly as prac"*
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ticable, to eliminate the conditions above referred to Cin such industries
without substantially curtailing employment or earning power."

If, as in many other instances where the federal government has intervened, the several states had, through their own
legislatures, employed the power of regulation, the need of
federal action would not be so apparent.
Goods produced in a state whose legislature has neglected
or refused to place restrictions upon what we may, for the sake
of argument, call oppressive labor conditions, have an advantage over goods produced in other states. The protection of
American goods from unfair competition by nations having
lower labor standards is one of the reasons for our protective
tariffs.
If any state legislature is disinclined to pass a particular
piece of social legislation no outside influence, even of the
federal government, can change its attitude.
It is not my purpose to discuss the question whether the
fixing of maximum hour and minimum wage standards and
the prohibition of child labor are desirable ends to be accomplished, and I am not taking the position that such ends can
be accomplished only by means of federal legislation.
The point with which we are chiefly concerned as lawyers, and the one I take to be of most interest is: Now that
Congress has acted and passed the legislation, can its validity
be sustained under the Constitution? In other words, what
is the Supreme Court going to do with it? I am not going to
predict the result but I shall attempt to outline some of the
constitutional objections which are certain to be raised before
the law passes the final test. This will require a very interesting consideration of the history of the Court's decisions as
to what constitutes interstate commerce under the commerce
clause, and what constitutes due process of law under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The handle that opened the door to the passage of the
Law and the basis for justifying Congress' control over the
matter is found in the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution:
"The Congress shall have power

*

*

*

to regulate commerce

with foreign nations and among the several states and with thL Indian

Tribes

DICTA

By the terms of the Law, regulation of wages and hours of
employees and the prohibition of child labor are confined to
employees "engaged in Commerce or in the production of
goods for Commerce," and commerce is defined in the. Act as
meaning "trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or
communication among the several states or from any state to
any place outside thereof." It is obvious that if the Act were
limited to employees engaged in actual commerce between the
states its effect would be confined largely to the business of
transportation and there is no real doubt but that the field so
limited would be a proper one for Congressional regulation.
SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE

The Employee's (Hours of Service) Act of 1907 fixing
maximum hours of continuous work for railroad employees
engaged in interstate transportation was sustained by the
Supreme Court in 1911 in Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, where Mr.
Justice Hughes said:
"The length of hours of service has direct relation to the efficiency
of the human agencies upon which protection of life and property
,necessarily depends,"

and the Court held that inasmuch as Congress had acted
within the interstate commerce field there could not be denied
to it the exercise of its constitutional authority.
The validity of the Adamson Act (45 U. S. C., sec. 65),
which established an eight-hour day for employees of carriers
engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, and in
Ellis v. United States, 206 U. S.246, the court held that the
Act of August 1, 1892, prescribing an eight-hour day on
public works (40 U. S. C., s. 321) was not repugnant to the
Federal Constitution.
The important feature of the Wage-Hour Law as a departure from previous legislation, is that it is made expressly
applicable to "the production of goods for commerce.
Twenty years ago the court held that the authority of
Congress under the commerce clause might not be extended to
control interstate commerce in the products of child labor; in
the words of the court:
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"*
* * the mere fact that they (the goods) were intended for
interstate commerce transportation does not make their production subject to federal control under the commerce power * * *. Over interstate transportation, or its incidents, the regulatory power of Congress
is ample, but the production of articles intended for interstate commerce,
is a matter of local regulation."
(Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S.
251, 272).

Every argument for permitting Congress to prohibit interstate transportation of goods produced by child labor was
considered in that case and held to be of no avail in face of the
fact that the making of goods was not "commerce." Mr.
Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion, argued that "Regulation means the prohibition of something, and when interstate commerce is the matter to be regulated * * * the
regulation may prohibit any part of such commerce that Congress sees fit to forbid."
(247 U. S. at p, 277). The states
could regulate their internal affairs and their domestic commerce as they saw fit but when they sought to send their
products across the state lines they were no longer within
their rights and Congress might carry out its view of public
policy whatever indirect effect that might have upon the
activities of the states. (ibid, p. 281 ).
The prevailing opinion, however, expressed the doctrine
which the court had followed on many previous occasions.
And this view persisted as late as 1936 when the court
decided that the Guffey Act regulating the bituminous coal
industry was unconstitutional and held that manufacturing,
lumbering and mining processes constituted intrastate production and were beyond the power of Congress to regulate.
(Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238). A decision of
the court, so recent as May 16, 1938, calls the manufacture of
goods "a purely intrastate activity" even when they are sold
in interstate commerce (J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304
U. S. 307 at p. 313).
In 1935 one of the court's grounds for holding the N. I.
R. A. unconstitutional was that the activities of the persons
therein involved, wholesale dealers in poultry, which had been
shipped in interstate commerce, were not subject to regulation
by Congress because they were neither transactions in nor acts
relating to interstate commerce.
(Schecter Poultry Co. v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495).
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I have just stated the doctrine prevailing in the court
prior to its 193 7 decisions under the National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act in which the court, so it seems to me, departed
from the views that it had so long held.
WAGNER ACT AND COURT ATTITUDE

The decisions of the court in the Wagner Act cases indicate that the power of Congress under the commerce clause
extends to relations between employers and their employees
engaged in manufacturing to the extent necessary to protect
interstate commerce. Logically, therefore, the constitutionality of the Wage-Hour Law in its application to the production of goods for commerce must be based upon the views of
the court in the Wagner Act cases, rather than on the prior
decisions of the court.
It is not too much to say that the doctrine expressed in
Hammer v. Dagenhart must be overruled or greatly limited,
if it has not already been so limited, to sustain the law in its
application to employees "engaged in the production of goods
for commerce."
The effect of the change in the attitude of the court as to
the extent of the regulatory power of Congress under the interstate commerce clause may be observed in the record of the
debate in the Senate the day the bill was passed. [Congressional Record, June 14, 1938, p. 12043 ]:
"Mr. Glass: Mr. President, I want to ask a very simple question
of the constitutional lawyers who differ so widely in their interpretation
of the Constitution. I should like one of them to define for me what
constitutes interstate commerce. Specifically in order to keep out of
jail, I should like to ask them if I am engaged in interstate commerce in
publishing two newspapers because of the fact that I buy my newsprint
in Maine or some other state, or because I purchased my newspaper press
from New Jersey, or because I am compelled to buy my type, when I
buy type, from some other state? Am I engaged in interstate commerce?
"Mr. Borah: Does the newspaper circulate in several states?
"Mr. Glass: Let me ask the other questions now which these constitutional lawyers may be able to answer: What constitutes actual
interstate commerce? Suppose I have a newspaper with 20,000 subscribers and all of the papers circulate in Virginia except to ten subscribers. Am I engaged in interstate commerce?

154

DICTA

"Mr. Borah: Mr. President, if the Senator is purchasing his goods
for the purpose of making up his newspaper in different states and he
takes them to a particular place where he uses them and he transmits his
newspapers into other states-I do not think the number-the number
10, 20, or 30 is controlling. I think the Senator is engaged in interstate
commerce.
"Mr. Glass: Well, I do not.
"Mr. Wheeler: Well, if I may interrupt the Senator from Idaho,
I will say to the Senator from Virginia that twenty years ago he would
not have been engaged in interstate commerce but if he is not considered
to be engaged in interstate commerce now, he will be considered to be
engaged in interstate commerce ten years from now because the law will
be so changed and the courts will finally come to the conclusion that he
is engaged in interstate commerce.

Three of the Wagner Act cases at the 1936 October Term
involved employers whose business was manufacturing. One
of the employers was a clothing manufacturer whose one
establishment was located in Richmond, Virginia. A large
portion of the material which went into the clothing was
shipped in from other states and 85% of the company's products was sold in other states, but the activities of the employees
took place entirely within the State of Virginia. In determining that the relations between the employer and his employees
were subject to regulation by Congress, the court considered
not only the activities of the employer involved but the industry as a whole, quoting a finding of the Labor Board that:
"The men's clothing industry is thus an industry which is nearly
entirely dependent in its operations upon purchases and sales in interstate
commerce and upon interstate transportation."

In the Jones Z4 Laughlin Steel Corporation case [301
U. S. 1 ] it appeared that the corporation was engaged in the
manufacture of steel in Pennsylvania, receiving its raw materials from and selling its products in other states and the court
held that, under the commerce clause, Congress had power
to regulate the relations between the corporation and its employees, including those whose activities were confined to intrastate manufacturing. Through the Chief Justice the court
expressed the view [301 U. S. 37] that:
"Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstfuctions, Congress cannot be denied
the power to exercise that control."

DICTA

155

The court's decision in the Wagner Act cases indicates
that the production of goods to be shipped in interstate commerce is subject to federal regulation in order to prevent labor
disputes burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow
of commerce.
WAGE AND HOUR REGULATION

It will be remembered that the "Adamson Act" (45 U.
S. C. §65) was passed at the instance of President Wilson to
avert a strike of the four railway brotherhoods. (Burke v.
Monumental Division, No. 52 Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers,273 Fed. Rep. 707).
Does the power of regulation extend beyond the prevention of labor disputes? Is it necessary for the protection of
interstate commerce to give Congress power to fix wages and
hours and to prohibit child labor in the production of goods
for commerce? This is the primary question of constitutional
power which the court must answer. Of course, in every case
there will also be a question of fact,-"Are the employees engaged in the production of goods for commerce?"
Along with the question whether Congress has power to
enact laws applicable to intrastate activities, justified only
upon the basis of the interstate commerce clause, run other
constitutional questions arising under the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Statutory regulation of the number of hours that a man may work, and of the amount of
wages that a man must be paid, and statutory prohibition of
the employment of children are, in a sense, limitations upon
or deprivations of freedom of contract, and deprivation of
liberty, including liberty to contract, is forbidden by the Fifth
Amendment, if without due process of law.
I assume that Congress has just as broad powers to legislate on matters committed to it by the Constitution as do "the
states in their sovereign capacity touching all subjects jurisdiction of which is not surrendered to the federal government"
and it seems clear that Congress can in the exercise of the police
power incidental to its delegated powers do in its proper field
what the states can do in theirs. Assuming then that the field
is one in which Congress has power to legislate by reason of
the interstate commerce clause, is the legislation justified under
the police power by the need to protect the health and welfare
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of workers engaged in the production of goods for commerce?
In the finding and declaration of policy contained in the
Act the case for regulation is stated by Congress in terms that
have sustained state laws regulating wages and hours:
"The Congress hereby finds that the existence, in industries engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living
necessary for health, efficiency and well being of workers * * * (2)
burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce. * * *
(5) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce.

On the question whether the Act is justified under the
police power the court's decisions dealing with the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of similar state
laws are, therefore, important.
HOURS OF LABOR

In Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, the court held,
in 1905, that a New York statute fixing maximum hours of
labor for bakery employees was not, as to men, a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power, but an unreasonable interference with the right and liberty of the individual to contract
in relation to his labor and as such in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. "
Subsequently, however, the court sustained the constitutionality of a statute limiting the work hours of women,
[Muller v. Oregon (1908) 208 U. S. 412], distinguishing
Lochner v. New York on the ground that women were involved. The decision may be said to have been based upon
infirmities inherent in sex, and the court, referring to woman,
said
"Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is properly
placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protection
may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men and
could not be sustained."

Similar legislation where women were involved was sustained
in Riley v. Massachusetts,232 U. S. 671 (in factories) ; Miller
v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373 (in hotels); Bosley v. McLoughlin,
236 U. S. 385 (in hospitals); and the New York statute
which restricted the employment of women in restaurants at
night. Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292.
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Furthermore, in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, the
court, in 1917, sustained an Oregon law limiting the hours of
work of employees in manufacturing establishments without
regard to the sex or age of the employee, thereby implicitly
reversing Lochner v. New York.
The justification for such statutes now seems to be that
they are health regulations passed in exercise of the state's
police power to safeguard the health of workers.
If a state may limit hours of labor as a health regulation
without violating the Fourteenth Amendment, may not Congress do the same thing in the field of interstate commerce
without violating the Fifth?
MINIMUM WAGES

The Supreme Court's treatment of minimum wage statutes, in one respect at least, has not paralleled that fixing hours
of employment. The court held in 1923 in Adkins v. Childrens Hospital [261 U. S. 525 ], that a law passed by Congress fixing minimum wages for women employed in the District of Columbia was in violation of the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment, Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting. Noting
the court's frequent approval of state statutes fixing minimum
work hours for women he was moved to comment that he did
not "understand the principle on which the power to fix a
minimum of wages for women can be denied by those who
admit the power to fix a maximum for the hours of work."
Despite adverse criticism the authority of the Adkins case
was recognized as controlling for fourteen years and in 1936
a New York minimum wage law for women was held unconstitutional in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298
U. S.587.
About eight months later, however, the court held valid
the Washington minimum wage statute for women in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish [ 300 U. S.379 ] and overruled the
Adkins case, stating that "the decision in the Adkins case was
a departure from the true application of the principles governing the regulation by the state of the relations of employer and
employed." The challenge to the validity of the distinction
made by the Adkins case between minimum wages and maximum hours so far as concerned the limiting of liberty of contract was successful.
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There has been, so far as I am aware, no case before the
court involving the validity of a statute fixing minimum
wages for men. This is apparently an undetermined matter.
Classification on the basis of sex with regard to hours of work
seems no longer to be the rule. Can it persist in respect to
minimum wages in the face of the claim recognized in the West
Coast Hotel Company case, that a legal distinction between
wages and hours cannot be sustained?
CHILD LABOR

The law prohibits transportation in interstate commerce
of goods produced by oppressive child labor.
As we have seen, however, this provision of the law is the
very one which the Supreme Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart
held to be invalid, as an interference with the rights of the
states.
Congress, therefore, has sought, in the Wage-Hour Act,
to effect a reversal of Hammer v. Dagenhart. If "federal control under the commerce power," which was there held not to
apply because manufacture was not commerce, and therefore
those engaged in manufacture were not engaged in commerce,
is hereafter held to justify the regulation of child labor, presumably it will be so held in deference to the plea that exclusion of products of unprotected child labor from interstate
commerce "is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce
'from burdens and obstructions." The statute evidently was
written with the presentation of that argument in prospect.
Whether the court will vary, on that or another ground, the
finding in Hammer v. Dagenhart, we shall only know when
the court has spoken.
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

No consideration of the constitutional hurdles which the
Wage-Hour Law must surmount would be complete without
discussing one which invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act. As the Chief Justice said in the Schechter case:
"The Constitution provides that 'All legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States'
*
*
*
-The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to
transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which
it is thus vested."
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The N. I. R. A. was fatally defective, as Mr. Justice
Cardozo said, for the reason that in that case "The delegated
power of legislation * * * is not canalized within banks
that kept it from overflowing. It is unconfined and vagrant.
* *

*"

The Wage-Hour Law delegates some powers to an Administrator who is appointed by the President. The Administrator is authorized to appoint an industry committee for
each industry engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce and the Administrator has power, in industries where circumstances warrant it, after consulting with
the Committee, to establish a lower rate, not less than 30c
per hour, below the 40c per hour rate fixed by the Act. The
Industry Committee and the Administrator are further authorized to establish reasonable classifications within the
industry for the purpose of fixing separate wage scales for
such classifications based upon local conditions, including
cost of living and production costs. The Administrator and
his subordinates are authorized to determine within certain
standards what constitutes "oppressive child labor prohibited
by the act." The Administrator is given broad power of
definition with respect to certain classes of employees exempt
from the provisions of the act. The question is whether the
delegation of powers to the Administrator is limited to the
application of standards contained in the law, that is, is the
delegated power confined "within banks that keep it from
overflowing?"
The objection will undoubtedly be raised
when the law comes before the court. The General 44 Hour
Week Law of Pennsylvania was recently declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of that state (Holgate Brothers
v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255) on the ground that it contained
an unconstitutional delegation by the Legislature of its
powers, but the objectionable delegation seems to have been
in the fact that the schedules of working hours fixed by any
federal regulatory body were made the standard under the
Pennsylvania Law. It was for the same reason that the State
Recovery Act (Laws of 1933, ch. 781) was held unconstitutional in this State. Chief Judge Crane, speaking for the
majority of the Court of Appeals, said:
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"Stripped of all its verbiage, and narrowing these provisions down
to the real authority, we find that the Legislature of the State of New
York has turned over to the National Administrator the question of
determining whether there shall be price-fixing in New York State of
coal and what it shall be. The Legislature has left too many things to
be determined by other bodies to make this law constitutional." (Darweger v. Staats, 267 N. Y. 290, 304).
CONCLUSION

To repeat, what we have here to consider is an enactment
that is primarily concerned with economic policies to one
phase of which the Act is designed to give effect. It is not
my purpose to pass upon the merits of the Act, in its bearing
upon the public welfare, or to agree with or oppose this particular item of political policy. Our examination is restricted
to speculation whether the provisions of the Act will bear
the scrutiny of the law when they come to be tested in the
Supreme Court. If much of the consideration has turned
upon recent decisions of the Supreme Court, it is because the
expressions of the court in those cases indicates that the commerce clause is now regarded as having an extensile quality,
the farthest limits of whose expansion the court may not as
yet have announced. Five years ago, or even three years ago,
most of us would have been disposed to say that the law was
not within the power of Congress to enact, under the Constitution, in the light of decisions then taken as controlling. But
when we have before us the court's reversal of its own controlling decision in the Adhins case, and add to that its action
in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins at the last term, overruling Swift
v. Tyson, we have ample indication that the court has no
qualms about reversing even decisions that are century old. In
this situation, and in the light of the recent decisions that have
passed under review as being pertinent to the problems of constitutional interpretation, any one who would now give an
opinion that the Wage-Hour Act is not within the power of
Congress to enact must have more assurance than I have that
the Act will be declared unconstitutional when the Supreme
Court comes to pass upon it.
There can be no doubt that the question of who is and
who is not engaged in "the production of goods for commerce"
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will be many times posed for answer and will be productive
of much litigation; nor that the judicial ingenuity and resourcefulness of that great tribunal will be exhausted in answering the question.
There is, for example, the fact that goods produced in
one state and sold in another state are in competition with
goods produced and sold exclusively within a state. Will
this competition bring within the power of Congress the regulation of intrastate production, if the competition should
prove to the disadvantage of the part that is under interstate
regulation? This is by no means an idle inquiry. The power
of the Interstate Commerce Commission over interstate transportation rates has resulted in regulation by that Commission
of intrastate rates where such rates enable carriers to compete
on more favorable terms than those enjoyed by interstate
carriers. Manipulation of manufacturing, if it is shown to
affect the price of the article in interstate commerce, has been
declared a violation of the Anti-Trust Act. If price is adversely affected, as to articles in interstate commerce, by the
competition of articles that are only in intrastate production
and commerce, can we be quite certain that regulation under
the commerce power will not be resorted to? And if it shall
prove that the power of Congress can be and actually is
directed to the control of more and yet more matters heretofore
regarded as entrusted solely to local authority for regulation,
who is there that would venture to set limits to the process of
erosion, or define with certainty what remainder of power,
over what have been accepted as local matters, will remain to
the states?
In the measure whose bearings we have been considering,
the disposition of Congress in this respect is manifested in
ways that admit of only one inference. What we have next
to learn is whether the Supreme Court considers the perseverance of Congress, up to this point at any rate, consistent with
its powers under the Constitution. For that we must wait,
as we must wait, also, for indications as to whether the states
are concerned over the trend of events or are passively acquiescent. Time alone will tell.
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ANNUAL BANQUET OF DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
The annual banquet of the Denver Bar Association will
be held at the Cosmopolitan Hotel, Monday evening, May
15th next at 7 p. m.
Members of bar associations outside of Denver are cordially invited and a special invitation is extended to the ladies.
The dinner is $1.50 per plate, evening dress optional.
The committee, consisting of Myles Talmadge, Ward
Bannister, Irving Hale, Jr., Horace Hawkins, Jr., S. Arthur

Henry, Erskine Myer, Gustave Ornauer, Albert L. Vogl,
Floyd Walpole and C. A. Bailey, will appreciate the making
of reservations as early as possible.
S. Arthur Henry will be Toastmaster.
Tickets can be obtained in the various office buildings
from the following members:
University Building
----------------------------Arthur H. Laws
Colorado National Bank Building -Jacob Schaetzel and Merrill Knight
First National Bank Building --------Frazer Arnold and James A. Woods
E. F C. Building
Bryan Whitehead and Edward Fiske
Equitable Building
--------------- Morrison Shafroth and Associates
Symes Building
Sidney Grossman and Molly Edison
Majestic Building
---------------------Theodore Adams
Midland Building_
--------------Fred E. Neef
West Side Court -------------------------John A. Carroll and David Brofman

Hon. Thurman Arnold, Assistant United States Attorney General, will be the guest speaker of the evening. John
0. Rames, of the Denver Bar, and one other local speaker will
deliver addresses of interest to the membership.
Mr. Arnold is a Westerner, having been born in Wyoming. While
educated in the East, he returned to Wyoming to practice law. His
career, both as an educator and in public life, is outstanding. He was a
lecturer in law at Wyoming University from 1921 to 1926; Dean of the
West Virginia Law School from 1927 to 1930; Professor of Law atYale
from 1931, and is now on leave of absence. He was Special Counsel in
defense of the constitutionality of the AAA in 1933; temporary legal
advisor to the Governor General of the Philippines in 1935: Trial Examiner SEC in 1935. He is the author of several outstanding articles
and books. Probably his best known book-a best seller-is "The
Folklore of Capitalism," published in 1937.
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STATE LEGISLATURE ENACTS THREE UNIFORM
CRIME LAWS
By DONALD J. GILLIAM*

N June 1934, the Federal congress enacted the AshhurstSumners Act (Public No. 293, H. R. 7353), giving
blanket consent for the states to enter into agreements
on compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance for
the suppression of crime. Following the passage of the Act,
attorney generals of the various states at their annual conference in Washington were urged to bring about cooperation
of the efforts and agencies of the states under the Act.
To ensure an effective means of promoting intrastate
compacts, a national body known as the Interstate Commission on Crime was created. The Commission was the outgrowth of a conference held at Trenton, New Jersey, in October, 1935, and attended by representatives of forty states and
of the Federal government. Today this Commission, consist*Member of Denver Bar. Senator from Denver in present Assembly.
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ing of official representatives of every state and of the Federal
government, is devoting itself to the control of crime through
administrative and legislative action. It has recommended
and prepared legislative acts for consideration by the state legislatures. Edward V. Dunklee of Denver is the member of
the Commission from Colorado.
On September 24th and 25th of last year, representatives
from twenty-five states assembled in Kansas City to bring into
being compacts between those states under the provision of the
uniform act for the supervision of probationers and parolees.
Colorado was one of the first of the states to set up machinery
to enter into interstate compacts. The legislature in its regular
session of 1935, adopted a measure which established the Attorney General as a commissioner with power to enter into
compacts with other states for such purposes, subject to ratification of the compacts by the General Assembly (Ch. 141,
Session Laws of Colorado, 1935), and pursuant to which a
compact between the states of Kansas, New Mexico, Wyoming
and Colorado was signed and subsequently ratified by the
General Assembly, and is now in force and effect (Ch. 180,
Session Laws of Colorado, 1937). Each state has followed
its own procedure, however, for compliance with the Federal
act.
As a member of the present legislature, I introduced five
uniform bills into the senate providing for interstate compacts.
The first of these bills, known as Senate Bill 168, has been
signed by the governor and is now a law. It is known as Uniform Act concerning the Fresh Pursuit of Criminals, and its
purpose is to prevent state lines from handicapping law-enforcing agents in the apprehension of criminals. At the present time our most desperate criminals immediately attempt to
cross the state line after the commission of a crime, which does
not involve Federal laws, knowing that there is comparative
safety beyond the border; for in the foreign state the pursuing
officer from the state wherein the crime was committed is no
longer an officer. This situation, which is contrary to all justice and reason, is remedied in a simple manner by this act.
The moment an officer who is in fresh pursuit of a criminal
crosses a state line, the state he enters will authorize him to
catch and arrest such criminal within its bounds. The statute
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grants this right only when the officer is in fresh pursuit of a
criminal; that is, pursuit without unreasonable delay, by a
member of a duly organized peace unit, and only in cases of
felonies or supposed felonies occurring outside the boundaries
of the state adopting the act.
The second bill (S. B. 169), known as the Uniform Act
concerning Witnesses, has likewise been signed by the governor
and is now a law. Its purpose is to secure the attendance of
witnesses from without a state in criminal proceedings. At
the present time in most states it is impossible to obtain the
testimony of witnesses, important to the prosecution, who
either live outside a state or have fled from the state. This act
provides a procedure to enforce their attendance at such criminal proceedings, at the same time protecting their rights as
citizens.
The third bill (S. B. 170) was buried in committee. It
facilitated the transfer of criminals from one state to another
and was known as the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.
The need for a procedure of extradition between the states was
recognized by the Constitution of the United States, even at a
time when the ramifications of criminal organizations as they
exist today were unknown. The Constitution, Section 2,
Article IV, provides that the governor of the state may demand the return of a criminal to the state having jurisdiction
of the crime, a provision not self-executing and therefore developed by Federal and state statutes with a lack of uniformity
and much confusion in administration. This act brings uniformity in such matters. It gives to the governor the power
to extradite a person who has come into the state involuntarily. It provides for requisition of a person already under
prosecution or undergoing punishment in another state, so
that he may be prosecuted in the demanding state while the
evidence is still fresh; but with the understanding that at the
termination of the prosecution he will be returned to the state
which extradited him.
The adoption of the proposed act by the various states
will constitute a definite recognition of the duty imposed by
the Constitution, and of the importance of mutual and reciprocal action by the states, in carrying out that duty in all cases,
whenever the proper procedural machinery has been set in mo-
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tion. Moreover, it will provide a method by which complete
uniformity of action and harmony of purpose among the
states can be achieved in a very difficult field.
An important provision of the act is that which permits
an accused person to be delivered to a demand state even
though he is not a fugitive from justice in the terms of the
Constitution as interpreted by the courts; namely, where the
accused shall have committed an action in one state which has
the effect of constituting a crime in another state, in which the
accused is not present in person at the time of the act, into
which he does not thereafter go, and from which, as a consequence, he does not flee. The importance of this provision is
easily understood when thought is given to the vast conspiracies indulged in by organized criminals which may, and often
do, involve operations across the borders of several states. Unless the demanding state-the one in which the criminal injury
occurs-can have the cooperation of other states in securing
the accused person for trial, he is largely immune from prosecution and punishment. The only exceptions to this unjust
result are those few instances where such interstate operations
constitute Federal crimes, or where in certain states he may be
held as a conspirator or accessory, though the final crime occurs
in another state. While the power given by these provisions
of the act is not covered by the Federal law relating to extradition, it is one which may properly be granted and exercised by
each state.
Another important provision of the proposed act permits
the waiver of extradition. In the few states in which a waiver
provision has been previously adopted, extradition is actually
waived in a large majority of all cases. There is no reason why
the beneficent result which has been achieved in a few states
through waiver of extradition should not be attained by the
others, eliminating tedious and expensive processes of extradition.
The fourth bill (S. B. 171) has been signed by the governor and is likewise a law. It provides for supervision of
out-of-state parolees and probationers in order to aid in the
rehabilitation of these convicted of crime, by permitting such
persons, either before or after having served a sentence in custody, as the circumstances warrant, to take their place in soci-

DICTA

167

ety again, but under proper supervision. Cases constantly
arising where, due to the existence of their family in another
state, better opportunities for employment there, or similar
reasons, such rehabilitation would be facilitated by transfer
to such other state. The act is reciprocal in character, authorizing the states adopting it to enter into compacts whereby
under certain circumstances each agrees to supervise parolees
from the other state.
The last bill which I introduced was likewise buried in
committee.
The Interstate Commission on Crime has been very successful in having its legislation enacted in the various states.
Prior to the meeting of the legislatures this year, the uniform
acts have been enacted into law 88 times.
Twenty-nine states have taken action and have adopted
a part or all of the program, while five additional states have
legislation closely akin to the Uniform Parolee Act.
The Fresh Pursuit Law has been enacted by twenty-three
states. The Extradition Act has been approved by the legislatures of nineteen states, the Witnesses Act by twenty-three
states and the Parolee Act by twenty-three states. Arizona,
California, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, Vermont and West Virginia have
adopted all of the acts; Nebraska, Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island have adopted three of the acts; Connecticut, Kansas,
Louisiana, North Carolina and Washington have adopted two
of the acts; and Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota and Virginia have adopted one of the acts.
Perhaps the greatest achievement to date of the Commission has been the adoption by twenty-five states of the interstate compact for the supervision of out-of-state parolees and
probationers, and the preparation and submission of uniform
rules and regulations to effect the operation of the compact.
This compact was signed by the governors of commissioners
of Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah,
Vermont, Washington and Wyoming.
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Aside from the direct benefits which will accrue to the
states from the operation of this compact, it is significant that
this undertaking marks the beginning by a large number of
states to accomplish by coordinated state action that which
states have too long considered beyond their jurisdiction and
consequently a matter for Federal regulation. It ushers in a
determination by the states to protect state's rights through
their own actions, rather than have them taken over by our
central government.
Two highly respected members of the bar of Colorado
Springs, Hon. James F. Sanford, County Judge of El Paso
County, and Hon. L. W. Cunningham, formerly a member of
the County, District and Court of Appeals Bench, have passed
away during the last month.
Irvin E. Jones has been appointed to succeed Judge Sanford upon the county bench of El Paso County. Judge Jones
was a former President of the El Paso County Bar Association
and formerly served as Assistant District Attorney. His choice
by the County Commissioners was made because it appeared
to be the consensus of the bar that he was best suited to fill the
vacancy.
More than 100 lawyers of the Fourth Judicial District
of Colorado attended the Law Institute held at the Broadmoor
Hotel in Colorado Springs on April 15. Dexter Blount, President of the State Association, presided over all sessions. Golding Fairfield of Denver led the conference in the afternoon on
"Developments in Real Estate Law and Conveyancing."
James D. Parriott of Denver spoke at the dinner meeting. At
the evening meeting Edward L. Wood of Denver discussed
the "Handling of Automobile Liability Cases."
Arrangements for the meeting were handled by President Leon Snyder
and Clyde Babcock, secretary of the local association.
CHARLES J. SIMON,

Correspondent.

PROPOSED NEW RULES OF COLORADO CIVIL
PROCEDURE

A

By PHILIP S. VAN CISE*

Tthe annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association

last fall it was unanimously voted that the Colorado
Code of Civil Procedure should be amended, as far as
practicable, to conform to the new Federal Rules. Pursuant
thereto the association secured new legislation empowering the
Supreme Court to act by rule. This was done by Senate Bill
119, which was approved by the governor February 25, 1939.
Under this act the Supreme Court may make rules for
all courts of record, governing the practice and procedure in
civil actions and all forms in connection therewith. Such
rules, when adopted, shall take effect three months after their
promulgation by the court.
The court has now notified the association that it will
welcome a draft of suggested rules prepared by its authorized
committee. George Dexter Blount, the President, has appointed the writer as Chairman of the Advisory Committee.
The committee has been split into four sections, ( 1) Rules as
based upon the Code and existing Colorado Supreme Court
Rules; (2) Forms; (3) General Statutes which properly belong in the Code; (4) Revision, to criticize and harmonize
the work into the final form for the court. The Supreme
Court will, in turn, amend this work as it sees fit.
The purpose of the committee is to prepare a complete
new Code of Procedure, following, so far as practicable, the
order and phraseology of the Federal Rules, but not being
hide-bound by the latter. Where the Colorado practice is
preferable we will retain it; where the Federal Rules can be improved we will suggest such change: where they are inapplicable they will be disregarded. The task of the committee
will be to make one practice for both jurisdictions, and to
simplify the work of the lawyer and the courts. The cardinal
principle involved will be to expedite and simplify litigation,
so that rights will be determined at a minimum of time and
expense.
Denver lawyers are being given the brunt of this work
for the reason that they can meet on short notice and without
*Chairman of the Advisory Rules Committee, Colorado Bar Association.
of Denver Bar.
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expense. But Mr. Blount is asking the president of each Bar
Association in the state, outside of Denver, to select a representative to be a member of Group No. 4. These association
members will be sent the revision draft, and will be asked to
submit the same to a meeting of their local Bar Associations.
When all Bar Associations have acted, another draft will be
prepared, public hearings will be held in the Supreme Court
room, and then the final draft will be assembled and submitted
to the court.
The lawyer out in the state has problems of which city
attorneys know nothing. And we particularly want the
country lawyers to work on this code so that it will apply to
all sections of the state and to all kinds of practice in courts of
record. We welcome and ask for suggestions from every
member of the bar.
We wish to express our thanks to West Publishing Company for a large number of copies of its Annotated Rules on
Civil Procedure, The Lawyers' Co-Operative Publishing
Company for additional copies of the rules, and BradfordRobinson Printing Company for four copies of the Code.
The first meeting of the committee will be held in the
Supreme Court room in the Capitol Building on Monday,
May 8th, at 7:30 P.M. It is expected that at least forty lawyers will be in attendance.
Between fifty and seventy-five lawyers will be on the
committee, but more are needed and volunteers are called for.
As a sample of the problems before the committee, the
Rules provide for appeals from District to Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Code for writ of error to the Supreme Court. If
we are to use one practice for appellate work, the writ of error
should be abolished-yet it is provided for in the Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 23, from County Court to Supreme Court.
The Code was adopted in 1887, in a horse and buggy age.
Many of its provisions do not appear in the Rules. Yet all
such should be amended and brought down to date, and in
other cases the Rules and Code be synchronized. As a sample
of duplication in times gone by, Sec. 451 provides that,
"The seal may be fixed by impressing it upon the paper, or on a
substance attached to the paper and capable of receiving the impression,"

while Sec. 397 provides that,
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"it may be impressed with wax, wafer or any other substance, and then
attached to the writ,* or it may be impressed on the paper alone."

Both are in the 1887 Code, adopted at the same time!
No special amendments will be attempted at this time on
County Court special proceedings. That work, if needed,
will be left to another committee.
We ask that all judges and lawyers write at once to the
chairman, giving their criticisms of and suggestions about the
present code or rules so that these can be referred to the proper
sections for study.
We were preparing to study Rule 27 with Code sections
400 to 405, when Percy Morris informed us that he, Golding
Fairfield and Fred Sanborn had just amended these sections in
the present legislature! So send in your amendments now.
Members of the committee to date are as follows:
GROUP No. 1-DRAFTS
Judge J. T. Adams
Judge Wilbur Alter
Walter M. Appel
Hamlet J. Barry
Guy Brewster
Tom M. Burgess
W. Clayton Carpenter
John A. Carruthers
Harold George Chapman
Edward V. Dunklee
William R. Eaton
Golding Fairfield
Frank Fetzer
Ernest L. Fowler
Omar E. Garwood
Benjamin L. Griffith
Charles H. Haines
Mark Harrington
Horace Hawkins, Jr.
Judge H. Lawrence Hinkley
Herschel Horn
D. I. Hutchinson
Gail L. Ireland
Thomas Kelley
Arthur Laws
Bruce M. McCay
J. Warner Mills
Percy S. Morris
Harry Petersen
W. W. Platt

Ira Quiat
Harold D. Roberts
Fred Sanborn, Jr.
Fred Sanborn, Sr.
Jacob Schey
Harry Silverstein
Charles J. Simon
M. E. H. Smith
Mortimer Stone
Ben Sweet
Hubert D. Waldo
Ben S. Wendelkin
Judge S. Harrison White
Roger H. Wolcott
John Zanoni
GROUP NO. 2-FORMS
Carle Whitehead, Chairman
L.ouis A. Hellerstein
Glenn G. Saunders
GROUP NO. 3-STATUTES
Robert L. Stearns, Chairman
Cecil M. Draper
John L. Griffith
Frank Swancara
GROUP No. 4-REVISION
Charles C. Sackman, ChairmanWilliam E. Hutton
Kenneth W. Robinson
R. Hickman Walker
Edward L. Wood

WESTERN SLOPE LEGAL INSTITUTE
By JOHN C. BANKS*

HE awakening of the lawyers of Colorado to the realization of the values to be derived from better organized bar
associations and the holding of legal institutes continued
its sweep over the state with the meeting of the lawyers of the
Western Slope at Grand Junction on April 15th.
This Legal Institute was held under the active sponsorship of the Mesa County Bar Association and at the suggestion
and with the encouragement of the Colorado Bar Association's
Committee on Legal Institutes, through its chairman, William
R. Kelly of Greeley. Over fifty per cent of the lawyers in fifteen widely scattered counties of the Western Slope attended
the meeting. At the afternoon session Mortimer Stone spoke
on the subject of Contracts for the Sale of Real Estate and distributed a comprehensive outline of points which should not
be overlooked in the preparation of such contracts. Following
this talk, a discussion was had on the requirements as to default provisions and the manner of protecting the vendor
against the clouding of the title by the purchaser's recording
the agreement. Many questions were asked which led to an
exchange of ideas and practices among the lawyers from the
various communities.
Farrington R. Carpenter of Hayden, Colorado, formerly
the head of the Division of Grazing of the U. S. Department
of the Interior, gave an interesting talk on the growth of the
various grazing laws and the reasons for the interpretations
which have been given to them by the department.
Hon. John R. Clark of Glenwood Springs presented a
resolution, endorsed by all the Western Slope lawyers, to secure a state convention of the Colorado Bar Association at
some date in the future for Glenwood Springs.
At six-thirty dinner was held in the Blue Room of the
La Court Hotel. Charles M. Holmes, president of the Mesa
County Bar Association, served as toastmaster. Max Melville of Denver spoke on the Unlawful Practice of the Law,
and pointed out how the Colorado Supreme Court has been
very lenient in its interpretation of what constitutes unauthorized practice.
William R. Kelly brought the greetings of the Colorado
*Member of Grand Junction Bar.
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Bar Association to the institute and told of the enthusiastic
reception which the legal institutes had received in various
parts of the state.
The lawyers present from Delta, Gunnison, Montrose
and San Miguel counties expressed the desire for an organization of lawyers in those counties, together with those in the
counties of Hinsdale and Ouray which were not represented,
so that they could be admitted into the Colorado Bar Association as a unit. Plans were formulated and a committee appointed to proceed with the formation of such a bar association.
Much credit and praise for the way the meeting was handled should be given to the Mesa County Bar Association's
Committee on Legal Institutes, consisting of Silmon Smith,
chairman, E. B. Adams and William Weiser, all of Grand
Junction, and also to Eugene Mast, secretary.
WELD COUNTY BAR MEETS
The Weld County Bar Association held its monthly meeting in

Greeley at The Inn, Friday evening, April 7, at which there were twenty-one members present. Among them was Mrs. Shirley Payne, attorney
at law, of Windsor, Colorado. Mr. Fred Winner of the Denver bar was
a guest of the local association.
Mr. Max D. Melville of Denver spoke to the group on the pertinent
subject, "The Illegal Practice of Law," which problem has been progressively commanding the attention of the members of the profession.
Members of the local association whole-heartedly endorsed the expressions of Mr. Melville.
Mr. Charles C. Townsend, president of the local bar, named Robert G. Smith, B. A. Woodcock, and John W. Henderson, all of Greeley,
as a committee on nominations to effect a report for the forthcoming
meeting in May, at which time new officers will be installed.

JOHN W. O'HAGAN, Secretary-Treasurer,Weld County Bar Association.
Judge John B. O'Rourke has appointed the following members of
the bar of the Sixth Judicial District to revise the rules of court for the
district:
A. R. Mollett, Durango, Chairman
L. M. Perkins, Durango
Reese McCloskey, Durango
John H. Galbreath, Pagosa Springs.
Chairman Mollett reports that a draft of the proposed revision will
be presented to the Southwestern Colorado Bar Association for examination and suggestions at the next meeting of the association.
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Albert P. Fischer of Fort Collins was elected president of the Larimer County Bar Association at the annual meeting held recently in Fort
Collins. Arthur E. March of Fort Collins was selected as vice-president,
and Dale E. Shannon of Fort Collins as secretary-treasurer.
The main speaker of the meeting was Judge Claude Coffin, who
discussed "The Perfect Jury."
Judges and ex-judges seemed to have
monopolized the program, as all of the officers, except Mr. Shannon, are
ex-judges, and the speaker came from the bench.
Immigration of lawyers to Larimer County in the past few months
has become exceedingly heavy. It is rumored that the quota has been
used up for many years to come.
There are five newcomers to the locality: Ray A. Gunning, formerly of Denver, has opened a law office in the First National Bank
Building, Loveland: Jerome Smith, graduate of Drake University, at
Des Moines, Iowa, has started to practice law in the Colorado Building,
Fort Collins; Robert McCreary, graduate of Washington University, at
Washington, D. C., has opened up law offices in the Wilson Block; G.
Herman Howard, graduate of Southwestern University, at Los Angeles,
California, has hung up his shingle in the Lyric Building, Fort Collins;
and Dale E. Shannon, graduate of Kansas University, has become associated with Fred W. Stover and Herbert A. Alpert in Fort Collins.
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